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Abstract—Data security and availability for operational use
are frequently seen as conflicting goals. Research on searchable
encryption and homomorphic encryption are a start, but they
typically build from encryption methods that, at best, provide
protections based on problems assumed to be computationally
hard. By contrast, data encoding methods such as secret sharing
provide information-theoretic data protections. Archives that
distribute data using secret sharing can provide data protections
that are resilient to malicious insiders, compromised systems, and
untrusted components.
In this paper, we create the Serial Interpolation Filter, a method
for storing and interacting with sets of data that are secured
and distributed using secret sharing. We provide the ability
to operate over set-oriented data distributed across multiple
repositories without exposing the original data. Furthermore, we
demonstrate the security of our method under various attacker
models and provide protocol extensions to handle colluding
attackers. The Serial Interpolation Filter provides information-
theoretic protections from a single attacker and computationally
hard protections from colluding attackers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer and data compromises have become so frequent
it is almost cliche´ to cite them as motivation for cyber-security
research. Rather than believing every attack can be prevented,
effective organizations must operate under the expectation of
eventual compromise [1]. Typical data protection methods
such as symmetric encryption depend on the enduring privacy
of a single key and thus can be insufficient for long-term data
security.
Distributed repositories using data splitting and encoding
techniques have been presented as promising ways to provide
data security even with compromised components [2]–[5].
These systems use encodings such as secret sharing [6]–[8]
to split the bytes of a file into N shares, any k of which can
be used to recreate the original data. Once the shares have been
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generated, they are then distributed across multiple reposito-
ries. This approach creates an archive that is resilient to insider
threat and is able to ensure data privacy and integrity with as
many as k− 1 repositories compromised. Additionally, secret
sharing has the benefit of being information-theoretically se-
cure, unlike many cryptographic methods which are based on
problems assumed to be computationally hard.
Most previous work on secret sharing has assumed access
to the stored information will occur through full reassembly
of the data. As a result, this data would then exist in a
single location and be significantly more vulnerable than when
it was split into shares. For several use cases, such as set
membership, full assembly of the secret may not be necessary.
Thus, performing a full assembly is an unjustifiable security
risk.
To illustrate how such a system would work, we present an
example of five companies who want to share a list of known
bad IP addresses. No one company trusts any other individual
company, but they trust the group as a whole. Any company
should be able to query and insert IP addresses, but none
should be able to access the entire list. Using secret sharing,
the companies split, exchange, and store the addresses. While
the addresses are secure at rest, a mechanism for query without
reconstruction is necessary.
To address this need, we present the Serial Interpolation
Filter (SIF), which allows collaborators to store a set of values
and support membership queries and inserts without exposing
the original values. Our contributions include:
• an information-theoretically secure method for operating
on set-oriented data stored across multiple repositories.
• a security and performance analysis of our method,
demonstrating the ability to maintain data confidentiality
in noncollusive environments while maintaining perfor-
mance.
• an extension to SIF using the discrete logarithm as a
cryptographic trapdoor to mitigate colluding adversaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review
related work and background information in Section II, de-
scribe the Serial Interpolation Filter in Section III, analyze our
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Fig. 1. Given two points, all possible values of p(0) are equally likely.
method in Section IV, discuss handling collusion in Section V,
and conclude our work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we present an overview of secret sharing,
including recent advances in the area, and compare our work
with searchable encryption.
A. Secret Sharing
Shamir [6] originally developed secret sharing as an
information-theoretically secure approach to share and store
a secret amongst a group with N members but reconstruct
the information with only k of the members. The algorithm
shares a secret amongst multiple participants by selecting a
polynomial of at most degree k− 1, setting the y-intercept of
the polynomial to be the desired secret, and distributing points
on the polynomial with non-zero x values.
To demonstrate how Shamir’s algorithm works, suppose
Christine has a safe with the combination d = 854. In an
emergency, Christine wants to allow any three of the five
people from her office to combine their information to open
her safe. She would also like to prevent any fewer than three
people from gaining any information about her combination.
To do so, she encodes the combination, d = 854, into N = 5
shares and requires k = 3 of these shares to recover the secret.
To do this, she generates a random polynomial of degree at
most k − 1, since any three points can uniquely identify this
polynomial:
p(x) = d+ 276x+ 53x2.
Christine’s safe combination is encoded as the value of
a polynomial curve at x = 0. Christine now creates shares
by evaluating the polynomial at x-values other than 0. By
combining any three of these points, Christine’s officemates
can solve for the original polynomial and recover the com-
bination. However, with only two shares, there are as many
possible intercepts as there are possible values for d, all
equally likely. Fewer than three shares divulges no information
about the combination. Figure 1 illustrates how, given two
specific points, any possible value of d = p(0) is an equally
likely solution.
In practice, we typically perform all secret sharing opera-
tions over a finite field. This allows us to choose polynomial
coefficients randomly over a uniform distribution over the
elements of the field and obviates floating point errors [6].
This area continues to be an active field of research with
many different variations of secret sharing [6]–[11]. No-
tably, Narayanan et al. discuss information-theoretically secure
membership tests for a secret-shared set [12]. However, the
work assumes the set is static and the user issuing queries
cannot collude with shareholders.
B. Searchable Encryption
This work is akin to searchable encryption [13] and ho-
momorphic encryption algorithms [14], [15]. Such algorithms
allow a user to perform certain operations such as remote
keyword searches or computing functions on encrypted data
on an untrusted server without decrypting the information or
pulling all of the encrypted data back to the user. Recent ad-
vances in searchable encryption include multi-keyword ranked
searching on cloud data with low computation [16] and work
with limited size on a user’s mobile device [17].
However, the fundamental security protections provided
by encrypted data have many limitations. An attacker that
compromises the single host gains access to all of the data.
Solutions to searching encrypted data are computationally
secure rather than information-theoretically secure and depend
on the assumed hardness of certain problems. Homomorphic
encryption is typically very expensive, and while specialized
hardware exists, it is limited in utility. Even encryption with
multiple hosts does not capture the benefits of secret sharing
because the data is replicated instead of split into shares. To the
best of our knowledge there has been little work on operating
on data in a secret-shared archive.
III. SERIAL INTERPOLATION FILTER
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the
Serial Interpolation Filter method. We show this method
can enable operational use of the data while maintaining
information-theoretic data security, a protection well above
commonly used symmetric encryption techniques.
A. Using Secret Sharing to Store a Set
We draw from previous work [2]–[5] that proposed using
secret sharing to create a secure, distributed archive. While the
archive is usable for any type of data representable as a set,
we use IP addresses as our exemplar.
A trusted user creates a new entry after externally determin-
ing a specific IP is untrusted. To securely store this element,
it is split into N shares using a (k,N) linear secret sharing
scheme [6]. As shown in Figure 2, once the shares are created,
they are then distributed across N separate repositories to
create the archive holding the list of known bad IP addresses.
For example, if there are 20 bad addresses, each of the N
repositories would hold 20 shares unique to that repository.
The aggregate of these repositories is an archive securely
storing 20 addresses. Once the shares have been distributed,
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Fig. 2. An example of share distribution to securely store an entry in a
distributed archive.
the user deletes the original data. After this, the list exists
solely as an abstract concept and no single repository holds
data recognizable as an IP address (or component thereof)
in isolation. It is this unique property that separates such
solutions from systems using encryption for data security.
When one of the repositories is inevitably compromised [1],
the attacker learns nothing beyond the size of the set of
elements. Even additional compromises, as long as they num-
ber less than k, do not let the attacker gain any additional
information about the list contents. Ideally, the consortium
is able to refresh the shares with new polynomials using
techniques such as those by Herzberg et al. [11] before the
intruders have enough shares to reconstruct the data.
B. Terminology
We define the following terms:
• Element—One entry in the set of data. We wish to
simultaneously protect and use these elements.
• Share—A resulting datum from using secret sharing to
encode an element into N pieces.
• Threshold— The number of shares, denoted as k, needed
to recover the original element.
• Repository—A remote server storing a unique set of
shares.
• Archive—The collection of all N repositories. Together
they create a system for securely storing and operating
on data elements.
We perform all secret sharing operations over a finite field
F . The data is a set D = {d`|d` ∈ F, 1 ≤ `} and is of size
|D|. We split each data element d` ∈ D using a polynomial,
p`(x), of order k − 1. The polynomial takes the form
p`(x) = d` + a`,1x+ · · ·+ a`,k−1xk−1
where a`,i ∈ F is a coefficient chosen uniformly at random
for ` ∈ {1, . . . , |D|}, i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
We denote the list of shares given to Repository r as ~p(xr),
which is the vector of all of the polynomials evaluated at xr.
We use the vector notation to represent interpolation performed
on all shares concurrently.
C. Serial Lagrangian Interpolation
In traditional secret sharing, given a set of k points, S =
{x1, . . . , xk} and their corresponding shares (p(xr) for xr ∈
S), we can use Lagrangian interpolation to reconstruct the
generating polynomial, p(x) as
p(x) =
k∑
i=1
Li,S(x)p(xi),
where
Li,S(x) =
∏
xj∈S
xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj .
This allows for recovery of the original element by evalu-
ating p(0).
The archive stores the elements as the y-intercepts of
polynomials, ~d = ~p(0). Here, we use the vector notation to
denote operation over all elements in the set. In our example
we select a finite field able to represent 232.
To avoid reconstructing the polynomials in a single location,
we perform Lagrangian interpolation serially across a subset
of k out of N repositories. The list of k repositories to be used
is provided as a part of the SIF query and known to all of the
repositories involved. Furthermore, the data of each repository,
~p(xr), is private and known only to the repository owning that
data. Therefore, while all of the repositories can compute any
of the Li,S(x), only Repository r has access to ~p(xr). Thus it
is possible to calculate ~p(0) across three repositories (k = 3)
as follows:
~p(0) = L1,S(0)~p(x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repository 1
+L2,S(0)~p(x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repository 2
+L3,S(0)~p(x3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repository 3
.
~p(0) =
x2x3
(x1 − x2)(x1 − x3)~p(x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repository 1
+
x1x3
(x2 − x1)(x2 − x3)~p(x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repository 2
+
x1x2
(x3 − x1)(x3 − x2)~p(x3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repository 3
.
Nevertheless this calculation would reassemble the original
secret in a single location. To perform a set membership test
while not exposing the polynomial or query term, we must
perturb both the query and the polynomial reconstruction with
a vector of nonces, or randomly generated constants. This
process is described in detail in the next section.
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Fig. 3. An example of query algorithm for testing set membership.
D. Generalized Algorithm
Once the shares have been distributed, we can now use the
SIF to test for set membership. We present the query algorithm
a user at a repository would perform to determine if the value
Z is present in the archive. An example query round and user
response for a (k = 3, N = 5) secret sharing can be seen in
Figure 3.
1) A user at repository R1 initiates the query with a unique
transaction identifier q. R1 then selects k repositories
including itself and creates an ordered list of these
repositories S = [x1, . . . , xk]. It generates a nonce
vector (~ν) containing a different random pad for each
element and calculates ~γ1 as follows:
~γ1 = L1,S(0)~p(x1) + ~ν
2) R1 sends a membership test message (m1 = [q,~γ1, S])
to the next repository listed in S. In Figure 3, R1 sends
the message to R2.
3) R1 calculates a nonced query term ~Q = Z~1 + ~ν and
sends a separate message, mQ = [q, ~Q], to the kth
repository. As k = 3 in Figure 3, this message is sent
from R1 to R3.
4) Ri for i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1} receives the message from
Ri−1 and serially calculates its portion of the interpola-
tion polynomials
~γi = Li,S(0)~p(xi) + ~γi−1
and sends mi = [q,~γi, S] to repository Ri+1.
5) Rk: Calculates the final contribution to the interpolations
~γk = Lk,S(0)~p(xk) + ~γk−1
and compares each component in ~γk to each corre-
sponding component of the query terms ( ~Q) received
in message mQ in step 3. If a match is found, the query
response is set to true and false otherwise.
6) Rk sends the results of the query to the request origina-
tor R1 (mr = [q, True|False]). This final response is
seen as the gray arrow returning from R3 to the user at
R1 in Figure 3.
The user U can determine if the value Z is in the set while
no other user learns the value of Z. Additionally, none of the
secrets (~d = ~p(0)) are ever reconstructed in a single location.
In short, the SIF protocol has enabled U to actively query
the data while maintaining information-theoretic levels of data
protection. In Section IV, we will discuss these protections
in detail and explain some limitations around adversarial
collusion.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the threat models we will use for
subsequent security and performance analyses.
A. Threat Model
In analyzing the Serial Interpolation Filter, we focus on the
confidentiality of the stored data and minimizing release of
information due to legitimate user queries. We assume users
are authenticated to the service and all legitimate users have
the right to place queries, which results in the user learning
if the item was contained (or not) in the set, but learning
nothing else about the set. We assume the presence of secure
communications channels.
With this in mind, we consider two adversary models:
• Honest-but-curious participants
• Byzantine participants
We start with the most restrictive model from the at-
tacker’s standpoint and gradually relax these assumptions
while strengthening our protocol. In the honest-but-curious
model, the attacker (i.e., any participating party including the
end-user) must correctly follow all parts of the protocol, which
includes sending correct protocol responses. The attacker
is allowed to perform extra calculations and store previous
protocol values, but is not allowed to actively aggregate infor-
mation it would not normally have received during protocol
participation (i.e., no collusion). Relaxing our assumptions
under a Byzantine model, we consider a system containing
N participants and a bounded number of malicious nodes
0 ≤ f < k, where k is the threshold value for the scheme.
The malicious nodes behave arbitrarily and are only limited by
the constraints of any cryptographic methods deployed [18],
which are assumed resistant to tampering. The set of malicious
nodes may collude.
As we focus on the confidentiality of the data and the
privacy of the queries, attacks targeting the integrity (e.g.,
reporting incorrect shares) or availability (e.g., withholding
shares) of the secret sharing algorithm are outside the scope of
this paper. Techniques such as proactive, public, or verifiable
secret sharing [8]–[11] can be used to augment our solution
to alleviate many of these issues, but are left for future work.
B. Security
Fundamentally, the security of the data rests on the privacy
of each repository’s shares, ~p(xi). It is the ability to aggregate
or otherwise calculate these values that constitutes a loss of
data protections. We also note that given fewer than k shares,
as proved by Shamir and others, an attacker gains nothing.
Intuitively, this is the same as defining a specific parabola
given only two points as shown in Figure 1 (i.e., there are as
many possible coefficients as there are distinct elements in the
field).
For the honest-but-curious model, the repositories are un-
able to calculate any specific shares held by other reposito-
ries. For R2 through Rk, ~γi is additively perturbed by ~ν.
Assuming strong random number generation, this provides
the same protections as a one-time pad for all repositories
except R1. Since R1 only receives a true/false result it has
no further information about the shares at any of the other
repositories. The result is our system maintains information-
theoretic protections on data confidentiality.
Under our Byzantine model, ~γk is protected only by ~ν
and malicious repositories may share partial results. Thus,
collusion between R1 who holds ~ν and Rk would provide
access to the complete set of secrets. While this vulnerability
to collusion provides data exposure, we note this is not the case
for the data at rest and we still provide data protections better
than those of typical encryption-based methods. Nevertheless,
in Section V we present a method using discrete logarithms
to provide computationally hard protections against collusion.
C. Performance
Recall from the generalized SIF algorithm that k denotes
the number of repositories involved in one query round. Fur-
thermore, we use |D| to denote the number of data elements
in the list. We assume it takes O(1) to compute a nonce and
to send a single data element. It takes O(k) work to evaluate
the Lagrange polynomial at each of the k repositories in the
round, resulting in O(k2 + |D|) work to carry out the entire
interpolation.
Additionally, each message passed contains O(|D|) data
elements and O(k) repository labels and therefore takes
O(|D|+k) work per message. Therefore, the work for message
transfers in a given round of the protocol is O(|D|k + k2).
The total work includes both the transfers and interpolation
giving a final result of O(|D|k + k2). We generally expect
|D|>>k, that is, the number of data elements vastly exceeds
the number of repositories necessary to carry out a query. The
computation is dominated by the messages sent rather than the
calculations done at each repository.
Similar arguments can be made for insertion using O(N)
messages and O(N) computation.
V. MITIGATING BYZANTINE ADVERSARIES
As was demonstrated in Section IV-B, the SIF protocol is
resilient to honest-but-curious adversaries but does not hold
these guarantees in the face of adversarial collusion. In this
section, we present a method for maintaining security in
Byzantine environments based on computational guarantees.
By utilizing a cryptographic trapdoor function based on the
discrete logarithm problem [19], we are able to create com-
putational SIF (cSIF) that is secure given at most k − 1
adversaries. Consider a (multiplicative) cyclic group Cq of
order q with generator g where the discrete logarithm problem
is assumed hard [20]. Under this scenario, we now present the
cSIF query algorithm a user at a repository would perform to
determine if the value Z is present in the archive. Original
share distribution and storage remains unchanged.
We present some notation regarding vectors. g~v represents a
vector where the `th component is gv` , the generator raised to
the power of the `th component of ~v. The operator  denotes
component-wise multiplication. For example, each component
ci of ~c = ~a~b is defined as ci = aibi.
1) A user at repository R1 initiates the query with a unique
transaction identifier q. R1 then selects k repositories
including itself and creates an ordered list of these
repositories S = [x1, . . . , xk]. It then generates a nonce
vector (~ν) and calculates ~γ1 as follows:
~γ1 = g
L1,S(0)~p(x1)+~ν
2) R1 sends a membership test message (m1 = [q,~γ1, S])
to the next repository listed in S (R2).
3) R1 calculates a nonced query term ~Q = gZ
~1+~ν and
sends a separate message to the kth repository (mQ =
[q, ~Q]).
4) Ri for i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1} receives the message from
Ri−1 and serially calculates its portion of the interpola-
tion polynomial
~γi = ~γi−1  gLi,S(0)~p(xi)
and sends mi = [q,~γi, S] to repository Ri+1.
5) Rk: Calculates the final contribution to the interpolation
~γk = ~γk−1  gLk,S(0)~p(xk)
and compares each component in ~γk to each correspond-
ing component of the query terms ( ~Q) received in step 3.
If a match is found, the query response is set to true and
false otherwise.
6) Rk sends the results of the query to the request origina-
tor R1 (mr = [q, True|False]).
A. Security Sketch
The constituents of ~γi for i ∈ {1, · · · , k} are now protected
as exponents of the generator function (e.g., gLi,S(0)~p(xi)).
Assuming the discrete logarithm is hard, the colluding
repositories cannot compute the logarithm of the messages
and find the original share values. This would be equivalent to
solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem [21]. Thus,
even under the Byzantine model which allows for collusion
between R1 who holds ~ν and Rk who holds ~γk, the two
repositories cannot gain any additional stored secrets. This
holds true for any subset of k−1 colluding repositories which
do not have enough shares to recreate the original data. The
primary use of the nonce vector in this case is to blind query
messages and responses.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Modern systems desperately need a way of securing data in
spite of compromise. While techniques like Shamir’s Secret
Sharing have been around for decades, the ability to oper-
ationally use data without exposing the original information
provides an important capability in efforts to ensure secure
and resilient computer systems. Our Serial Interpolation Filter
uses the strong data protections from secret sharing to secure
data at rest. In addition, we enable active use of data while
maintaining information-theoretic levels of protection during
a query. Although collusion between two members can expose
the original data set, we show how a cryptographic trapdoor
based on discrete logarithms can be used to enable computa-
tionally hard resilience to up to k − 1 colluding adversaries.
Future work includes minimizing the amount of data the
SIF protocol must store and transfer using advanced data
structures such as a quotient filters [22] or cuckoo filters [23].
Additionally, while the cSIF algorithm was able to tolerate
collusion, we hope to extend SIF in a manner tolerating collu-
sion among attackers while maintaining information-theoretic
security guarantees.
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